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Introduction 
The endemic nature of corruption in developing countries and the potential damage this can cause if it 
remains entrenched is not in question. In the search for policy responses attention has increasingly 
turned to the possible role of civil society in controlling corruption. The argument is that if civil society 
can be strengthened and its efforts at monitoring the state encouraged, this would contribute to the 
eventual elimination of corruption. However, to evaluate the role of civil society in developing 
countries in fighting corruption, we need to ask why corruption is so endemic in these countries in the 
first place. 
The characteristic of developing countries which inevitably strikes observers is the degree of internal 
political contestation that they persistently seem to suffer from. This instability is actually not difficult 
to explain. Development entails not just the adoption of new technologies but also a host of rapid social 
changes. In particular, development entails the creation of new classes based on new property rights or 
new allocations of property rights. Even if the fruits of these changes were widely distributed (and they 
often are not), the rapid changes in power and wealth contribute to deep social disruptions and 
discontent as a normal feature of life in developing societies, making them qualitatively different from 
advanced capitalist countries. In the latter, the types of property rights and their distribution change 
relatively slowly and the vast majority of the population have come to accept the legitimacy of the 
economic order. This was, of course, not always so and even as late as the early twentieth century the 
advanced capitalist countries of today faced frequent social upheavals. 
In developing countries the modern capitalist sectors, middle classes and so on have typically emerged 
within living memory and do not yet enjoy anything like a comparable degree of legitimacy. Even 
when the political regimes in these countries happen to enjoy a fair amount of legitimacy (and often 
they do not), this does not always translate into political stability. This is because the distribution of 
wealth, power and privilege in the wider society typically does not enjoy widespread acceptance; it is 
relatively easy for any excluded faction of elites to organise political dissent very rapidly against any 
particular regime. The emergence and persistence of corruption in developing countries has to be 
understood as a phenomenon which happens in these specific contexts. Political corruption is often part 
of a set of exchanges within patron-client networks through which incumbent elites construct political 
compromises with clients who would otherwise threaten the political stability of the system. While 
economists have looked at the economic incentives which state intervention creates for some types of 
corruption, they have typically not looked closely at the political conditions which also generate 
incentives for a related "political" corruption. We argue that political corruption is often an unavoidable 
part of maintaining political control in the unstable political environments in which most developing 
countries find themselves. Furthermore, political and economic corruption can get interlocked, since 
the resources to finance political corruption are often generated through the conventional forms of 
corruption which economists have identified. 
An analysis of corruption which incorporates its political dimension is important in at least two 
respects. First, since the political problem can differ across developing countries in significant ways, 
this approach provides us with a richer analysis of different scenarios of corruption. This in turn can 
help to explain differences in the economic effects of corruption in these different scenarios (Khan, 
1998a, 1998b). Second, this approach allows us to critically evaluate the role of civil society in 
strategies to fight corruption and it is this which particularly concerns us in this paper. If the 
pervasiveness of corruption is related to the types of contestation facing states, between and among 
capitalists and incumbent political elites, we need to examine the role of particular groups within civil 
society who generate this contestation in the first place and the possible effects of further attempts at 
strengthening "civil society". The results of such an examination suggests that we may have to be much 
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more specific about what we mean by civil society and much more explicit about identifying the 
interests and groups within it which are permissive of development. 
Section 1 examines the notion of civil society and contrasts it with the patron-client framework for 
looking at relationships between state and society in developing countries. Section 2 describes patron-
client networks in a number of developing countries and points out how differences in the composition 
of powerful groups in society can lead to very different patterns of resource flows within these patron-
client networks. As a result, there are significant differences in the types of corruption observed in 
these countries and in the economic consequences of these corrupt transactions. The argument is 
illustrated with reference to the countries of the Indian subcontinent, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand. In all these countries corruption was (or still is) more or less widespread at the early stages of 
development. But differences in the patterns of patron-client flows have meant that the consequences of 
corruption have differed greatly between them. 
Section 3 examines the consequence of such an analysis for an assessment of the role of civil society in 
anti-corruption strategies. In some countries the patterns of patron-client exchanges allowed rapid 
development which in turn allowed a consolidation of a capitalist economy. This in turn opened up the 
scope for an eventual reduction of corruption through a number of mechanisms including pressures 
from groups within civil society. In other countries the interlocking of political and economic 
corruption made the prospect of reducing corruption a much less tractable one. In these countries a 
large part of the pressures for political corruption came in the first place from non-capitalist middle 
class groups who were the most powerful sections of their "civil societies". Recent experience also 
suggests that it is possible for such groups to lead anti-corruption movements with the aim of 
demanding incorporation and a more favourable distribution from their point of view. Since the 
underlying structure of civil society is not changed, the victory of these movements has often only 
resulted in the replacement of particular groups with access to power without any significant change in 
the extent or consequences of corruption. It is therefore possible that there may well be conflicts 
between the further empowerment of the dominant groups within civil society and the transition to 
viable forms of capitalism which allow sustained reductions in corruption. 
1. Civil Society in Developing Countries 
The concept of civil society has an interesting history. The liberal conception of civil society is quite 
different from the origins of the concept in classical and Marxist theory. One of the key features of the 
classical approach to civil society was to identify the specific civil societies of particular countries. 
Thus the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who developed the first extensive analysis of civil society, 
was interested in the Italy of the 1920s. Gramsci’s work was based on Hegel and the early Marx. We 
do not need to discuss the differences between Marx and Gramsci or the different definitions of civil 
society to be found in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (for which see Gramsci, 1976: 206-275; McLellan, 
1979: 188-193; Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 69-115). The key point is that while mainstream Marxists of 
the time saw the state as the main defender of ruling class interests, Gramsci pointed out that the Italian 
capitalist system was in fact also buttressed by a powerful ideological apparatus which was responsible 
for creating social consent. This apparatus was operated by intellectuals and others who constituted 
"civil society". Civil society consisted of the private sector organisations which, though not strictly 
capitalist, created the ideological and ethical climate of support for the capitalist system. Gramsci 
argued that it was only in backward capitalist economies like pre-1917 Russia that the state was left to 
its own devices to defend capitalism. In the more advanced economies of Western Europe, such as 
Italy, the state was only "the outer ditch" protecting capitalism; the "fortresses and earthworks" were 
provided by civil society (Gramsci, 1976: 238). 
Gramsci’s target of attack were those Marxists who believed that a strategy of frontally attacking the 
state would work in Western Europe as it had in Russia. On the contrary, he argued, the most difficult 
part of the Marxist programme would be to counter the ideological hegemony in favour of capitalism 
created by the civil societies of these economies. Gramsci’s analysis is clearly historically specific. He 
does not argue that civil society would operate in this way in all capitalist economies, and certainly he 
points out that it did not work in this way in the relatively backward capitalist economy of Tsarist 
Russia. 
From these beginnings the concept of civil society became part of liberal-democratic political science 
by the 1960s. By the time the concept became part of mainstream political reasoning, the analysis of 
civil society was de-linked from the analysis of the nature of capitalism or the level of development of 
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the relevant economy. Civil society still refers to the set of private organisations and institutions which 
Gramsci had begun to analyse such as churches, clubs and more recently NGOs. But in the modern 
approach there is a tendency to speak of civil society in the abstract, without reference to the specific 
classes, fractions and economic interests they represent in particular countries. 
A second and equally important difference is that the motivation behind the interest in civil society has 
also changed. Where Gramsci had been interested in the role of civil society in co-operating with the 
political apparatus of the state to make capitalism politically viable, contemporary liberal-democratic 
analysis concentrates on the role of civil society in keeping the state in check. The change of emphasis 
reflects the change in the political conditions in advanced capitalist countries where these theories 
came from. In these countries the threat of revolution had faded and in the sphere of economic theory 
liberal market economics was gaining ground. In the eighties the state increasingly came to be viewed 
as a constraint whose activities were a source of both inefficiency and rent-seeking. 
The recent suggestion that civil society can act as a pressure group demanding accountability and 
transparency from both government and business clearly derives from the liberal tradition of political 
analysis. Its weakness is that it assumes, without analysis, a civil society in developing countries that is 
very much like the civil society we find in advanced capitalist countries. In contrast to Gramsci’s 
analysis of the actual classes and groups which constituted civil society in contemporary Italy, modern 
liberal democratic theories treat civil society as an abstract "good thing". It is implicitly an 
agglomeration of interest and pressure groups which have a collective stake in the capitalist system and 
can moreover monitor and keep in check the self-seeking state, which is also assumed. In fact, a 
detailed analysis of the composition and interests of the competing classes and groups which constitute 
civil society in today’s developing economies is critical for understanding their potential role in 
sustaining or challenging the persistence of corruption. 
The broadest features of such an analysis will have to be sufficient for this paper. The first distinctive 
feature of contemporary developing societies is that their middle and intermediate classes are relatively 
well developed given the degree of development of their economies, even though the degree to which 
these middle classes are developed varies in significant details (Khan, 1989). This was a product of 
colonialism in many of these countries that often created large middle classes to administer the colonies 
long before an equivalent capitalist sector emerged. Nevertheless, contemporary developing countries 
are also different from the advanced capitalist countries like Gramsci’s Italy, where civil society 
provided the "fortresses and earthworks" protecting the capitalist economy. The capitalist sectors in 
contemporary developing economies are relatively less developed, and competition between competing 
factions of capitalists and middle class groups much more volatile and aggressive. As a result the civil 
societies of contemporary developing countries do not generally act in concert with the political 
apparatus of their states to defend capitalism in the way Gramsci observed in Italy. 
One reason why this does not happen is that capitalism as a system in contemporary developing 
countries is not under serious threat from the working classes. Consequently the pressure on middle 
class leaders of civil society to collectively defend the system is much weaker. More importantly, the 
process of capitalist development is now much more rapid, the emergence of new capitalist classes 
more transparent and as a result the temptation to contest this process and put one’s own claim in are 
much greater. Middle class constructors of ideology in contemporary developing countries are as likely 
to feel illegitimately excluded from these processes as to believe that it supports their long-run 
interests. They are as likely or more likely to be populist opponents of the transition to capitalism as 
they are to be its apologists. This is why, unlike Gramsci’s Italy, many more middle class groups in 
modern developing countries are likely to be fiercely contesting the processes of capitalist 
accumulation. 
This observation helps to explain why patron-client linkages between state and society are so pervasive 
in developing countries. The analysis of patron-client exchanges initially developed to record and 
explain the repeated exchanges between patrons and clients who were distinguished by status, power or 
other characteristics (Schmidt et. al., 1977). However, patron-client exchanges were not confined to 
pre-modern societies but in fact frequently took place in societies well on the way to becoming modern 
and which had many modern institutions. Apart from habit and inertia, one reason why patron-client 
exchanges survive in early capitalist societies is that personalised and specific payoffs from patrons to 
clients provide a very efficient mechanism of purchasing political support by allowing the 
accommodation and incorporation of key groups of clients. In a context where the emerging capitalist 
system does not enjoy political stability and general acceptance, where the state is not strong enough to 
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enforce order by force and where civil society is failing to create the ideological support for the 
emergence of capitalism, patron-client networks which organise payoffs to the most vociferous 
opponents of the system are an effective if costly way of maintaining political stability (Khan, 1989, 
1996a). 
The consequences of such solutions depend on the structure of civil society in the developing country 
being considered and therefore the type and number of payoffs which have to be organised to 
"purchase" political quiescence. At the same time, these transactions are overlaid on conventional 
economic corruption, which is inevitably also taking place because of the weakness of policing 
institutions and the scope of the allocative decisions of the state, given underdeveloped market 
institutions. The problem is that the greater the political imperative for the state and incumbent political 
elites to raise funds for political payoffs, the greater the pressure to organise conventional economic 
corruption to generate these funds. State officials may of course be bribe-maximisers even without any 
political imperative. However, the constraints set by the magnitude and distribution of political 
demands has an effect not only on the magnitude of the resources which must be corruptly generated 
but obviously also on the structure of transactions through which the payoffs are eventually distributed. 
We argue that this interdependence of political and economic forms of corruption has important 
economic consequences. 
2. Civil Society as a Determinant of Patron-Client Networks 
While civil society in developing countries has some of the general features described in the last 
section, there are nevertheless significant differences between countries in the distribution of political 
power between competing groups of civil society. In this section we argue that these differences in the 
organisation and structure of civil society have consequences for the types of patron-client exchanges 
which we can expect to see as political stability is "purchased". The types of patron-client exchanges 
(which can include both corrupt transactions and perfectly legitimate ones) can in turn determine the 
economic performance of the society and the long-run viability of its process of transition to a more 
developed capitalist economy. 
To illustrate our argument we look at patron-client exchanges and the evidence of corruption and 
performance in the three countries of the Indian subcontinent, together with South Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand. The summary presented here is based on the more extended analyses of patron-client 
networks in these countries in Khan (1997 and 1998). The South Asian economies of the Indian 
subcontinent are the poorest performing of our group of countries and they also provide evidence of the 
most complex patron-client transfers and persistent interlocking of political and economic corruption. 
The corruption indices reported in Table 1 are based on subjective rankings by foreign business and 
have to be treated with caution. Nevertheless they show that the degree of corruption recorded in the 
South Asian countries in the eighties was not significantly different from South Korea and only slightly 
worse than Malaysia while fast-growing Thailand ranked much worse for corruption. It appears that by 
the nineties, relative corruption had begun to decline in fast-growing Thailand while it increased in 
sluggish South Asia. Corruption also seemed to be getting worse in Malaysia and South Korea, but not 
by enough to be significant given the subjective nature of these indices. 
Without reading too much into these figures, we can make two points. First, if corruption is related to 
economic performance, it may be that we need to look at the types of corruption and not just indices 
recording the magnitude of corruption as perceived by business. This point is more extensively argued 
in Khan (1998). Secondly, there is at least weak support in these figures for the hypothesis that rapid 
growth may eventually allow corruption to be tackled while slow growth can make corruption more 
entrenched. This hypothesis is much more strongly supported when we look at the advanced countries, 
which generally have much less corruption than developing countries. 
To see if significant differences exist in the types of corruption in these countries, we can begin by 
comparing the structure of their civil societies. Civil society in the Indian subcontinent has been 
characterised by a proliferation of groups and classes at the intermediate levels of society which have 
traditionally been exceptionally successful in dominating politics and getting selective payoffs for 
themselves. Despite important differences between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh there are important 
similarities in the types of exchanges which are negotiated within patron-client networks in these South 
Asian countries. A common feature is the often complex interlocking of exchanges between political 
elites, businessmen and intermediate or "middle class" organisers who organise and mediate social 
discontent. Economic and political calculations are closely intermeshed in such transactions. This 
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interlocking was described by Wade in his studies of corruption in the irrigation bureaucracy in 
southern India (Wade, 1984, 1985, 1989). 
A number of factors have contributed to the emergence of networks of interlinked exchanges in the 
Indian subcontinent. One of these has almost certainly been the exceptional political and social 
importance of intermediate classes in the Indian social structure. Important groups of clients in the 
Indian subcontinent have been drawn from these intermediate or "middle" classes. The importance of 
the professional members of the middle classes was recognised by Bardhan (1984), who described 
them as an equal member of the dominant class coalition in India along with capitalists and landlords. 
However, for our purposes it is useful to distinguish between the capitalist members of the dominant 
coalition and the much larger non-capitalist section which consists of a range of social groups who can 
very broadly be described as middle class. These are groups who have some education, a little capital 
and in all cases have organisational abilities which distinguish them from the broad masses of the poor. 
The middle class therefore includes, apart from the professionals, the broader educated and salaried 
sections of the population. The importance of these non-capitalist intermediate classes in the 
subcontinental political space far outweighs their numbers, which in any case would run into many tens 
of millions. 
The Indian subcontinent also inherited the effects of a deep-rooted anti-colonial political mobilisation 
which empowered their emerging "middle classes". Even before the anti-colonial movement had 
developed, a tradition of political activity had emerged in which competing groups from within the 
middle classes organised on the basis of a wide variety of emotive symbols including language, caste 
and religion to demand preferential subsidies, access to jobs and so on which would make the 
successful political players much better off. Politics based on these symbols has not enriched the vast 
majority of the populations of these countries but has enabled successive layers of emerging middle 
class groups to get access to public resources on the basis of their ability to organise much more 
numerous groups below them. At the same time, those amongst the intermediate classes who happened 
to be in power found it necessary to organise transfers to the most vociferous of the excluded groups in 
ongoing processes of accommodation and incorporation (Khan, 1989). 
In exchange for these transfers, patrons were "purchasing", however temporarily, political support or at 
least quiescence from the potentially most damaging groups of organisers. These transfers in turn had 
to be financed and patrons had to find the resources for such transfers either in general taxation or 
through exchanges with other groups of clients. The inadequacy of general fiscal resources is an 
important part of the reason why we observe a complex intermeshing of political and economic 
exchanges in patron-client networks in the Indian subcontinent. Political elites have often found these 
resources in their economic exchanges with other groups of clients, in particular the slowly emerging 
class of industrial capitalists. Thus dense networks of interlinked economic and political exchanges 
began to rapidly emerge in these countries. 
Capitalists as rational political actors began to ensure that they too were funding powerful 
constituencies so that their interest in leading the easy life could not be challenged. As a result, the 
politicians and bureaucrats who organised their political survival through such localised arrangements 
were often unable to change the structure or allocation of subsidies or other rights to capitalists even 
when this would raise growth. The difficulty of changing the structure of rights because of such 
interlinked patron-client exchanges served to block necessary structural change which in the long run 
slowed down investment and productivity growth. 
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Figure 1. Exchanges Between Patrons and Clients in South Asia 
 
The complexity of the stylised flows in Figure 1 captures the density of the typical flows within patron-
client networks in the Indian subcontinent and provides a useful comparison with our other countries. 
Bureaucrats and politicians in the diagram constitute two parallel hierarchies and at each level 
bureaucrats or politicians may be patrons for lower-level colleagues or for groups elsewhere in society. 
For simplicity Figure 1 only distinguishes between two social groups, the capitalist and non-capitalist 
clients of the state, the latter being the middle or intermediate classes discussed earlier. The most 
successful non-capitalist clients often become political leaders or even capitalists over time. The most 
distinctive feature of these patron-client exchanges are the transfers going from politicians at different 
levels to different groups of non-capitalist clients. Some of these payoffs, such as subsidies, may be 
perfectly legal. The more important ones are often illegal since they are secret payoffs to powerful 
organisers of groups and factions. The quid pro quo from these clients to the state is not shown because 
it is typically not an economic payoff but rather a political "payoff" in the form of quiescence or 
support. 
A large part of the resources for the payoffs to key "non-capitalist clients" comes from the rest of 
society in the form of taxes or transfers from other groups of clients. The "capitalist" clients of the state 
provide a part of these transfers not only in the form of taxes but also as bribes to their patrons in the 
bureaucracy and in the political structure. Emerging capitalists are willing to make these transfers 
because they too are often receiving subsidies or other allocations of valuable property rights. The 
kickbacks from industrialists are in turn an important source of finance for the political survival 
strategies of subcontinental politicians. 
We have argued elsewhere (Khan, 1996a, 1998) that this pattern of patron-client exchanges in the 
Indian subcontinent can contribute to an explanation of the relatively sluggish economic performance 
of these countries. The interlocking of economic with political calculations very rapidly prevented 
states from making rational economic allocations of subsidies, rights and resources even when in 
principle re-allocations would increase growth and notionally allow state officials or political elites to 
extract bigger bribes. This argument is similar to that proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) except 
that it relies on the political fragmentation of the middle classes and not on the institutional 
fragmentation of the state (see also Khan, 1996a, 1997). What is important for our argument here is 
that the structure of civil society is deeply implicated in the structure of payoffs which maintain 
political stability, some or much of which may involve direct corruption or resources generated 
elsewhere through corruption. 
If we compare this pattern of corruption with South Korea, we see the effects of the very different 
impact of Japanese colonialism which left a civil society where intermediate classes were exceptionally 
weak. Japanese colonialism destroyed the potential of a new middle class emerging from the 
countryside by destroying the rentier landlord class. It also ran its colonies with far fewer concessions 
to the political demands of local power blocs (Kohli, 1994). The relative weakness of competing 
factions within the middle classes allowed patron-client exchanges in South Korea to be restricted to a 
far greater extent to rent-sharing between capitalists and their patrons in the state (Khan, 1996a, 
1996b). This type of "economic" corruption appears to be far less damaging in its economic 
consequences than the South Asian variety. 
The revelations of corruption in South Korea which have begun to emerge in the nineties suggest that 
corruption there had probably been as extensive in terms of the relative magnitudes of the transfers as 
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in South Asia. On the other hand, the flows within patron-client networks appear to have been both 
different and simpler. This seems to have been particularly the case in the early days of industrial 
policy in the sixties (Kim, 1994: 59-70; Kong, 1996). There is evidence, however, that political power 
has become more dispersed over the eighties resulting in more complex patterns of transfers 
(Ravenhill, 1997). Nevertheless, compared to South Asia, South Korea’s civil society allowed a much 
higher degree of concentration of political power which in turn allowed the central political executive 
to extract rents from beneficiaries of subsidies and new rights without having to make political side-
payments to non-capitalist clients to anything like the same extent. 
Figure 2. Exchanges Between Patrons and Clients in South Korea 
 
Figure 2 shows the resource flows within patron-client networks in South Korea in a stylised way. The 
relative weakness of non-capitalist clients is captured by simply excluding them from the picture. The 
main features of the state-society transfers taking place were first the transfer of large subsidies from 
the state to emerging capitalists. These are shown by the arrows from different sets of patrons in the 
bureaucratic apparatus to clients in the industrial sector. This outline is consistent with Amsden's 
(1989) account of the flows associated with industrial policy in South Korea and is in its main features 
corroborated by a number of subsequent observers (Kim & Ma, 1997). There were in exchange 
substantial kickbacks from these favoured industrial groups to the political leadership, as rents from the 
growing industrial sector were re-distributed to the political leadership and through this route to 
bureaucrats as well (Kong, 1996). A part of these rents were also distributed in a relatively orderly 
fashion down the higher levels of the political and bureaucratic hierarchies. We have argued elsewhere 
(Khan, 1996a, 1997, 1998) that the ability of the state in South Korea to ignore political considerations 
in its allocation of resources and rights created strong incentives for the top political elites to maximise 
growth. Growth maximised their potential bribes in the long run and ensured the stability and viability 
of the country (Woo-Cumings, 1997). 
The South-East Asian countries provide interesting intermediate cases where a much stronger and more 
fragmented civil society existed but where this did not lead to the structural sclerosis observed in the 
Indian subcontinent. Although less powerful and entrenched than in the Indian sub-continent, emergent 
middle classes in South East Asia possessed a greater ability to organise political opposition and 
thereby demand political payoffs compared to their North Asian counterparts. The political and 
institutional responses in these South East Asian countries also show a wide range of variation in terms 
of the patterns of political side-payments which were organised to maintain political viability. Malaysia 
and Thailand provide two interesting contrasts. In both these countries political payoffs and corruption 
were important but did not prevent rapid accumulation and growth. 
In terms of inherited political problems, Malaysia inherited an ethnic problem which could potentially 
have spelt disaster. In the sixties it possessed an enterprising capitalist sector based on small-scale trade 
and production, but this sector was dominated by ethnic Chinese capitalists. On the other hand, an 
emerging Malay middle class was increasingly willing to use its political muscle to organise the Malay 
majority to get a larger share of the pie for itself. Fortunately, the co-incidence of ethnic identities with 
class ones helped the organisation of political payoffs in a centralised way. The orderly solution to the 
legitimation problem emerged as an unintended consequence of the 1969 riots and the adoption of the 
New Economic Policy, allowed the demands of the emerging Malay middle classes to be met in a 
centralised manner through an ethnically aligned political system. Political transfers were centrally 
organised without decentralised and interlocked exchanges at all levels of the state between competing 
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groups of political factions, middle class groups, capitalists and state officials along the Indian pattern. 
This allowed a greater degree of rationality in the allocation of subsidies and the protection of capitalist 
property rights than was possible in the Indian subcontinent (Khan, 1997; Jomo & Gomez, 1997). 
Figure 3. Exchanges Between Patrons and Clients in Malaysia 
 
Figure 3 presents, again in a stylised way, the characteristic features of the economic flows between 
patrons and clients in post-1969 Malaysia. The most important transfers were from the (largely) 
Chinese capitalists to the political leadership of the Malay party UMNO which dominated the political 
system. These transfers included both taxes and illegal extractions. The rents extracted were then 
centrally distributed through the political apparatus to the non-capitalist clients of UMNO shown by the 
arrows cascading down the political apparatus to non-capitalist clients. In return domestic capitalists 
received some protection and, increasingly, assistance for moving into high technology industries 
through the provision of good infrastructure and the negotiation by the state of backward linkages 
between domestic producers and the multinationals operating in Malaysia. Compared to the South 
Asian system, rent extraction from capitalists was centralised and, initially at least, direct links between 
particular capitalists and political factions in the Indian manner were less developed. This has changed 
to some extent over time as the Malaysian economy has grown and with it the political power of 
competing Malay factions within UMNO. But the picture sketched above is reasonably accurate for the 
early seventies when Malaysia began its economic takeoff. 
We should be careful not to attribute Malaysia’s centralised rent redistribution system entirely to its 
overlapping ethnic and class politics. Unlike the Indian subcontinent Malaysia is extremely rich in 
natural resources, and rents from these resources eased to a very large extent the exactions which 
capitalists would otherwise have had to suffer to pay for political stability. Nevertheless, the specific 
structure of civil society in Malaysia is an important component of a full explanation. The language of 
ethnic deprivation allowed a high proportion of these demands to be legitimised and therefore 
organised through centralised and legal party and state structures without secret deals and personalised 
bargains. This is consistent with the observation that Malaysia is the least corrupt of the group of 
countries shown in Table 1 according to subjective corruption indices. A non-ethnic and purely 
welfarist argument for transfers would not have been equivalent because it would have required that the 
bulk of the transfers went to the poorest groups and not necessarily to the leading factions of the 
intermediate classes who had the greatest political power. It is difficult to imagine an equivalent 
ideology in India which could have served to justify a similar centralised transfer from capitalists to the 
leaders of India’s contesting and diverse intermediate groups. 
Once again, the structure of patron-client exchanges has economic implications. First, the avoidance of 
dense localised networks of exchanges between patrons and clients along the Indian pattern allowed the 
allocation of rights and subsidies by the state to be determined and altered more rationally than in the 
Indian subcontinent. This flexibility has undoubtedly decreased somewhat over time as factions of 
intermediate groups within UMNO have become more powerful over time and have established 
decentralised alliances with large Chinese capitalist groups (Jomo & Gomez, 1997). Secondly, by 
credibly satisfying the demands of its middle classes through rent transfers from indigenous capitalists 
and natural resource rents, the Malaysian state could offer multinationals a high level of security for 
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property rights and profits which was untypical by developing country standards. This too proved to be 
of great importance in encouraging relatively high-technology firms to locate in Malaysia in the 
seventies and late eighties and engage in backward linkages with Malaysian firms. 
Finally, we look at Thailand which presents yet another pattern. In contrast to Malaysia, the Chinese 
capitalists of Thailand were much more ethnically integrated with the Thai middle class. Ethnic politics 
could not therefore emerge to legitimise the transfers to emerging middle classes. Thailand was also 
different from all the countries discussed so far in not having experienced direct colonial rule. The 
absence of anti-colonial mobilisations explains why the political leadership of its emerging 
intermediate classes appears to have been weaker compared to the Indian subcontinent or even 
Malaysia. On the other hand, its intermediate classes were not as atomised as they were in South Korea 
which had been subjected to Japanese colonial strategies. In contrast to South Korea, Thailand had 
powerful networks of rural politicians who had to be accommodated at a much earlier stage of 
development. Thus despite its differences with India, it is quite possible that decentralised networks of 
patronage may have developed in Thailand to meet the political demands of powerful and largely rural 
clients. Instead, over the last twenty years Thailand seems to have witnessed a gradual taking over of 
localized political networks by local capitalists. 
Figure 4 shows the transfers from capitalists to political factions which allowed Thai capitalists to take 
over and run their own political factions. As a result, Thailand has the highest number of businessmen 
in parliament in the region (Sidel, 1996). This fairly unique pattern of political corruption emerged 
because of the relative strength of a widely dispersed class of capitalists in this country who 
nevertheless still had to deal with the management of political demands from civil society. The direct 
purchase of political support by capitalists in this manner has prevented the interlocking of different 
groups of capitalists with rival groups of the middle class as in India, but it has also led to a high degree 
of corruption as capitalists have used their political clout to re-direct resources and rights in ways 
favourable to themselves (Doner & Ramsay, 1997). 
Figure 4. Exchanges Between Patrons and Clients in Thailand 
 
While this has had substantial economic costs, the Thai pattern of patron-client exchanges has 
nevertheless allowed growth. Competition between rival Thai capitalists with access to political power 
has meant that the Thai state could not centrally control resource allocation to the extent of South 
Korea. As a result Thai capitalism has been based on the acquisition of relatively small scale 
technologies, with property rights being protected in a decentralised way by this type of political 
corruption. 
The number of capitalists going into the political fray in Thailand has also been large, a result of a long 
history of accumulation by small-scale immigrant Chinese traders many of whom became extremely 
wealthy over a long period of time. This has ensured vigorous political competition between capitalists 
for the spoils of power, which has prevented the political system from being monopolised by any 
particular capitalist faction. Instead there has been vigorous competition for entry into markets through 
political competition between competing factions in the parliament and the bureaucracy. Thus despite 
rampant corruption and political instability, the long-run economic performance of Thailand has been 
relatively better than that of its South Asian neighbours. If political stability does not collapse entirely, 
long-run economic growth may eventually make it possible to attenuate the worst effects of Thai 
political corruption through constitutional and political reforms. 
 10 
3. The Role of Civil Society in Anti-Corruption Strategies 
The analysis of the last two sections suggests that there may be dangers in conceptualising civil society 
as a uniform collection of individuals who have a collective interest in making their society work. We 
have argued that the modern understanding of "civil society" has lost some of the insights which 
Gramsci had provided. The latter was concerned with a concrete analysis of the classes, factions and 
groups who actually constituted civil society in the countries he looked at. In contemporary developing 
countries, the politically dominant groups within civil society are clearly not representatives of 
"society" conceived of in its totality. The typical civil society organisations may represent groups less 
privileged than capitalists or landlords but they are by and large led by and ultimately serve the 
interests of the ubiquitous middle classes. 
These generalisations are subject to many qualifications. In particular, we have argued that differences 
across countries in the composition of the politically dominant classes have important implications. 
Moreover, the general picture does not in any way have to deny the existence of many committed trade 
unions, NGOs and other civil society bodies which make determined attempts to represent the interests 
of the average citizen. Rather the danger is to generalise from the relatively small number of the latter 
type of organisations to derive policy conclusions about the role of civil society in development in 
general and anti-corruption strategies in particular. 
The aim of introducing the analysis of patron-client networks has not been to deny the role of civil 
society in the fight against corruption. Rather it has been to stress the importance of a more concrete 
and country-specific analysis before social policy is pushed both internally and through the support of 
external agencies. From the late eighties onwards, developing countries have witnessed an upsurge of 
anti-corruption movements led by a wide variety of social forces. The social bases of these movements 
have so far not been properly analysed. Instead there has been a tendency to generalise by describing 
these movements in terms of a belated self-assertion by "civil society" to improve the governance of 
their economies. The implicit expectation has been (1) that these movements will gradually eliminate 
or greatly reduce corruption and (2) that the lowering of corruption will in turn accelerate development. 
The second claim is not considered in this paper. Nevertheless, it follows from what we have said that 
corruption may be associated with very different sets of economic performance ranging from the South 
Korean to the South Asian variants (for a more extensive discussion see Khan, 1998). Here we are 
concerned with the first link in the chain of reasoning: the claim that the greater mobilisation of civil 
society around anti-corruption slogans will actually contribute to the lowering of corruption in these 
countries. 
We have suggested earlier that an important impetus for political corruption in developing countries 
has come from the financial difficulties of dealing with demands from competing factions within civil 
society. The only viable strategy for maintaining political stability has often been to successively and 
selectively placate well-placed leaders and organisers. Empowering civil society in such contexts will 
only suppress these competing political demands if in some sense the whole of society is mobilised, 
thereby weakening the privileged position of middle class groups. This outcome is improbable given 
the material conditions of the poor in most developing countries. If on the other hand empowering civil 
society only results in a small number of additional groups led by (sometimes well-meaning) middle 
class individuals to the already crowded political domain, the aim of transparency and accountability 
may not automatically be achieved. 
Both Thailand and South Korea demonstrate the importance of the level of development in changing 
the prospects of anti-corruption strategies. In Thailand rapid development has led to the growth of a 
modern middle class based on the professions and service sectors. By the nineties, these groups found 
the patron-client nature of Thai politics increasingly intolerable and were willing to lead broad social 
movements demanding constitutional changes to reduce the role of "money politics". The growth in the 
Thai capitalist sector and the growth and sophistication of the Thai middle class means that in the 
medium-term, the current pattern of politics is likely to change. Thailand will be forced to evolve social 
democratic fiscal policies which redistribute income along welfarist principles. The growing wealth of 
the country means that in the medium term such policies will also be fiscally viable. Through a 
different route, and at a higher level of development, South Korea has been approaching a similar 
position from the late eighties onwards. Development has empowered a large professional middle class 
which is no longer willing to allow the cozy arrangements between government and business to go 
unquestioned. The medium-term prospects for these countries to evolve towards forms of social 
democracy must be judged to be good despite the current problems they face. 
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More difficult challenges face countries like those of the Indian subcontinent which are much more 
typical developing countries. Here economic development still has not proceeded to the point where 
broadly defined welfarist policies are fiscally viable. The tax base in these countries is unable to 
provide basic infrastructure let alone achieve political stability through transparent and accountable 
redistributions. At the same time the fractiousness and divisions within elite groups is increasing as 
frustration with slow economic growth provides enhanced opportunities for political organisation and 
mobilisation. The basic structure of patron-client exchanges in these countries is not evolving towards 
modern transparent social democracy but towards a more fractious and decentralised management of 
political stability by regional and local governments. As a result the patron-client exchanges necessary 
for maintaining political stability are no longer restricted to payoffs to a relatively small number of 
organisationally powerful clients at the centre but increasingly involve many more, if smaller, payoffs 
to competing political groups managed by regional and even local levels of government, or involve 
payoffs directly organised by local business in the fashion of payoffs to mafia bosses who provide 
localized security and protection. 
What are the likely consequences of promoting "civil society" anti-corruption organisations in these 
contexts? At best the consequences must be highly uncertain. The optimistic expectation is that 
pressure from new civil society organisations will force the myriad social groups engaged in social 
contestation to moderate their demands. It could be argued that civil society pressure will make it more 
difficult for powerful sectional interests to demand resources and make it more difficult to satisfy them 
without public scrutiny. But are these credible expectations? 
The problem is that most people in developing countries do not want to recognise the connection 
between the clamour of competing factions for resources and the persistence of political corruption. 
Yet this connection is of fundamental significance as the gap between the resources available and the 
demands made on them results in key organisers, leaders and groups having to be periodically, and 
usually corruptly, accommodated. Many middle-class leaders who support anti-corruption drives do not 
recognise that the activities of competing middle class groups in the aggregate contributes to the 
persistence of political corruption. Nor should we expect them to want a social mobilisation which 
proceeds to the extent that the factional interests of the middle class are seriously curtailed. Gramsci 
would have pointed out that there is no automatic identity of interests between the middle class leaders 
of civil society and the vast majority of poor people in developing countries. The leaders of civil 
society in Gramsci’s Italy supported capitalism not because they would not have preferred some 
redistribution to themselves but because they were more concerned about the demands of workers and 
peasants who were much better organised in Italy than in contemporary developing countries. It is 
unlikely that the competing middle class factions in developing countries who occasionally adopt anti-
corruption slogans will inadvertently mobilise workers and peasants to the extent that the collective 
redistributive activities of middle class factions has to be curtailed. 
If a few more factions enter the political space demanding an end to corruption but without a 
fundamental shift in the pattern of patron-client exchanges, this is at best only likely to drive political 
corruption underground or to force it to adopt new forms. The impetus for purchasing political support 
not only does not disappear but may in fact become stronger as charges of corruption make it more 
imperative for political incumbents to buy new political support. Once again, it is important to 
remember the constraint on resources. Resources are only available to pacify a few leaders, at best 
some of the upper layers of selected groups. The greater the political instability, the easier it is for new 
layers of leaders (though not necessarily from the anti-corruption groups!) to make themselves 
indispensable for political stability. 
These limitations are not only of theoretical interest. Recent experience suggests the limitations of 
popularly supported anti-corruption drives in the poorest developing countries. In the eighties and 
nineties repeated anti-corruption movements emerged in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh which 
collected behind them a wide range of middle class-led groups united under the anti-corruption banner. 
In each case the anti-corruption movements were ostensibly successful, corrupt leaders were replaced 
but no lasting change in social organisation emerged. Within weeks of the regime changes, charges of 
corruption began to emerge against new regimes and the cycle still continues. On the other hand, 
society paid the costs of these movements in the form of years of political instability and the economic 
disruption caused by political logjam and (in the case of Bangladesh) repeated general strikes. These 
huge social costs have yielded precious little in terms of better economic performance or higher rates of 
growth. Similar experiences could be repeated from other developing countries at similar levels of 
development—countries that also suffer from similar patterns of patron-client exchanges. This 
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disappointing experience is not at all surprising in view of the constraints we have described earlier 
which cause and sustain widespread and interlocking corruption in these countries. New regimes are 
ultimately no less susceptible to the logic of political survival when they come into power. 
Conclusions 
Policy has to attack the causes and not just the symptoms of political corruption. If one of the 
determining causes of political corruption is the fractiousness of competing middle class elite groups, 
corruption will not be reduced by adding to this fractiousness. The dichotomy drawn in modern liberal 
political theory between civil society and the state and the respective roles of the two in constructing 
viable forms of capitalism is not very helpful in the developing country context. Just as economists 
have often totally ignored the political preconditions for growth, political scientists have equally often 
misunderstood the economic constraints which prevent particular types of politics from being viable at 
early stages of development. In the worst performing developing countries, the dominant organisations 
of civil society are deeply implicated in the political impasse and in the redistributive pressures which 
have prevented accumulation and growth. Presenting the problem as one of bad states which have to be 
disciplined by good civil societies fundamentally misrepresents this historical reality. 
A precondition for effective solutions in the long run is the identification of the sources of the problem 
in each country. Competing interests have to be encouraged or even forced to face up to the 
consequences of their politics before viable institutional and political change can be constructed. 
Legitimacy is of great importance here. The language of civil society may allow the most self-seeking 
leaders of political factions in developing countries to present themselves as leaders of civil society. 
They may feel that their factions can exert pressure on the state with greater legitimacy if they abandon 
older symbols (caste, linguistic, tribal or religious) and adopt the modern and internationally acceptable 
position of criticising the corruption of the state (which in fact is often quite corrupt). 
To address this problem the analysis of civil society has to go back to its roots and examine the 
factions, interests and classes which compose civil society in particular societies and the consequences 
of pressures being exerted on the state by these specific groups. Whose interests are the dominant 
groups in civil society serving? Do they have an interest in promoting development or is the nature of 
their competition for redistribution itself part of the problem? If it is, civil society itself has to be the 
target of criticism and long-run political reform. Reform in turn can only be achieved by exposing the 
political economy of faction fighting. There may be no viable short-run solutions. We have to remind 
ourselves that ill-conceived anti-corruption movements have frequently only resulted in the 
replacement of one group of corrupt leaders by another. When civil societies do not change, recent 
experience has shown how the imperative of political survival can rapidly make new "anti-corruption" 
leaders as corrupt as the old order they replaced. 
Apart from exposing the political economy of factional conflict, corruption may also be tackled by 
accelerating development. Regardless of the causality, we are all agreed that more developed countries 
are less likely to be corrupt than less developed ones. Development changes both the structure of civil 
society and the pot of resources which is available to meet legitimate redistributive demands through 
fiscal transfers. It is utopian to expect the huge political problems of developing countries to disappear 
overnight or that conflicting demands can be transparently accommodated through fiscal transfers in 
the near future. Given these constraints, it is not the case that there are no differences between one 
group of corrupt leaders and another. There are major developmental differences between regimes, the 
policies they support, the constituencies they represent and the types of corruption they engage in. 










Amsden, A. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989. 
Bardhan, P. The Political Economy of Development in India. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 
Bardhan, P. The Role of Governance in Economic Development: A Political Economy Approach. Paris: 
OECD Development Centre, 1997. 
Buci-Glucksmann, C. Gramsci and the State. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980. 
Doner, R.F. & Ramsay, A. "Rents, Collective Action and Economic Development in Thailand," in 
Khan, M.H. & Jomo, K.S. eds. Rents and Rent-Seeking. forthcoming (1997). 
Gramsci, A. Selections from the Prison Notebooks edited by Hoare, Q. and Smith, G.N. London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1976. 
Jomo, K.S. & Gomez, E.T. "Rent-seeking and the Creation of Efficient Rights: The Malaysian 
Dilemma," in Khan, M.H. & Jomo, K.S. eds. Rents and Rent-Seeking. forthcoming (1997). 
Khan, M.H. "A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries," IDS Bulletin 27 (2), 1996. 
Khan, M.H. "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International Development 8 (5), 
1996. 
Khan, M.H. "Rent-Seeking as Process: Its Inputs, Outputs and Differential Effects," in Khan, M.H. & 
Jomo, K.S. eds. Rents and Rent-Seeking. forthcoming (1997). 
Khan, M.H. "Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia." European 
Journal of Development Research 10 (1), 1998(a). 
Khan, M.H. Clientelism, Corruption and Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming , 1998(b). 
Kim, H-K. & Ma, J. "The Role of Government in Acquiring Technological Capability: The Case of the 
Petrochemical Industry in East Asia," in Aoki, M., Kim, H-K and Okuno-Fujiwara, M., The Role of 
Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Kohli, A. "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 
‘Developmental State,’" in World Development 22 (9), 1994. 
Kong, T.Y. "Corruption and its Institutional Foundation," IDS Bulletin 27 (2), 1996. 
McLellan, D. Marxism After Marx. London: Macmillan, 1979. 
Mueller, D.C. Public Choice II: A Revised Edition of Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. 
Ravenhill, J. "Rents, Corruption and Development: Yes, No and Maybe," in Khan, M.H. & Jomo, K.S. 
eds. Rents and Rent-Seeking, forthcoming (1997). 
Schmidt, S.W., Guasti, L., Landé, C.H. & Scott, J.C. (eds.). Friends, Followers, and Factions. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 
Sidel, J. T. "Siam and its Twin? Democratisation and Bossism in Contemporary Thailand and the 
Philippines," IDS Bulletin 27 (2), 1996. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 108 No 3, 1993. 
Wade, R. "The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India," 
Journal of Development Studies, 18 (3), 1984. 
 14 
Wade, R. "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at Development," World 
Development, 13 (4), 1985. 
Wade, R. "Politics and Graft: Recruitment, Appointment, and Promotions to Public Office in India," in 
Ward, P.M. (ed.) Corruption, Development and Inequality: Soft Touch or Hard Graft? London: 
Routledge, 1989. 
Woo-Cumings, M. "The Political Economy of Growth in East Asia: A Perspective on the State, Market 
and Ideology," in Aoki, M., Kim, H-K and Okuno-Fujiwara, M. The Role of Government in East Asian 
Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
 
